Macroprudential stress tests have been employed by regulators in the United States and Europe to assess and address the solvency condition of financial firms in adverse macroeconomic scenarios. We provide a test of these stress tests by comparing their risk assessments and outcomes to those from a simple methodology that relies on publicly available market data and forecasts the capital shortfall of financial firms in severe market-wide downturns. We find that: (i) The losses projected on financial firm balance-sheets compare well between actual stress tests and the market-data based assessments, and both relate well to actual realized losses in case of future stress to the economy; (ii) In striking contrast, the required capitalization of financial firms in stress tests is found to be inadequate ex post compared to that implied by market data; (iii) This discrepancy arises due to the reliance on regulatory risk weights in determining required levels of capital once stress-test losses are taken into account. In particular, the continued reliance on regulatory risk weights in stress tests appears to have left financial sectors under-capitalized, especially during the European sovereign debt crisis, and likely also provided perverse incentives to build up exposures to low risk-weight assets.
Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2008, macroprudential stress tests have become a standard tool used by regulators to assess the resilience of financial systems. Macro stress tests have been designed to help macroprudential regulation, which essentially aims at preventing the costs of financial distress to spread to the real economy (Acharya et al. (2009 (Acharya et al. ( , 2010a (Acharya et al. ( ,b, 2012 ; Borio and Drehmann (2009) ; Hanson et al. (2011) ; Hirtle et al. (2009) ). Therefore, macro stress tests focus on a group of financial institutions that, taken together, can have an impact on the economy (Borio et al. (2012) ) and create systemic risk. Macroprudential regulation of these institutions reduces the probability and the cost of a financial crisis by forcing institutions to internalize their contribution to systemic risk.
However, concerns have been raised that macro stress tests do not serve the goal of macroprudential regulation as they should. Greenlaw et al. (2012) argue that macro stress tests are still microprudential in nature since they focus on the solvency of individual institutions. They also remain microprudential as they fail to characterize the 'endogenous' nature of systemic risk (Borio and Drehmann (2009) ; Galati and Moessner (2011) ). According to Borio and Drehmann (2009) , macro stress tests "risk lulling policymakers in a false sense of security" as they fail to provide real-time ex ante measurement of systemic risk.
Macro stress tests are also strongly dependent on Basel regulation defining measures (the capital ratios) of the financial performance of banks. Hanson et al. (2011) show that the capital ratios give incentives to banks to shrink their assets, which in turn leads to the amplification of financial distress. More recent concerns focus on the denominator of capital ratios (the risk-weighted assets) where multiple surveys point out the inconsistency of risk weights measurement across banks (Le Lesle and Avramova (2012); Mariathasan and Merrouche (2013) ; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013a,b) ). Haldane (2011 Haldane ( , 2012 also raises fears over the complexity and the robustness of risk weights and calls for simpler market-based metrics.
In this paper, we test macroprudential stress tests (including the most recent ones) by comparing their outcomes to those from a simple methodology that relies on publicly available market data (see Acharya et al. (2010a Acharya et al. ( ,b, 2012 ; Brownlees and Engle (2011) ).
1 The proposed measure (SRISK) represents the capital shortfall a financial institution would need to raise during a crisis, and is available on the NYU Volatility Laboratory website (Vlab).
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Vlab methodology is viewed in this paper as a benchmark to macro stress tests that addresses many of the above concerns.
The test of macroprudential stress tests comprises three steps, namely: (i) We compare projected losses from stress tests to market-implied losses and actual realized losses; (ii)
We compare required capital shortfalls of stress tests to the market-implied capital shortfall SRISK; and (iii) we consider the efficacy of regulatory risk weights and outline incentives created by the reliance on risk weights in asset portfolio decisions of banks.
Our assessment of regulatory stress tests reveals that the projected losses of stress tests and Vlab correlate well and both predict the actual realized losses of banks under severe economic conditions. In striking contrast, the required capitalization of financial firms in stress tests is found to be inadequate ex post compared to SRISK. We document that this discrepancy arises due to the reliance on regulatory risk weights in determining required levels of capital once stress-test losses are taken into account.
The deviation with Vlab is even greater with European stress tests where a too mild stress on capital makes the impact of the stress scenario only apparent on the denominator (risk-weighted assets) of capital ratios. For these stress tests, several results tend to show that if the too mild stress on the numerator (capital) may have been responsible for the too low aggregate capital shortfall estimate, the stressed risk weights were responsible for the 1 Other surveys on macroprudential stress tests include Alfaro and Drehmann (2009); Borio et al. (2012) ; Greenlaw et al. (2012) ; Hirtle et al. (2009); Schuermann (2012) .
2 http://Vlab.stern.nyu.edu/ incorrect risk ranking and therefore, for the misallocation of capital shortfall across banks.
Even if the stress is too moderate, the ranking of the stress test capital returns is well correlated with banks' realized returns during the European sovereign debt crisis. However, the too mild stress produces positive returns estimates for some banks and, amplified by the size, the correlation between the stress test net losses and the realized crisis losses becomes negative. This results in a small impact of the stress scenario on the numerator (capital) compared to the impact on risk-weighted assets. Therefore, the stressed risk weights derived under Basel II appear as the main driver of lower capital ratios but these higher risk weights are shown to be uncorrelated to the actual risk of banks during a crisis.
Furthermore, Basel risk standards are proven to provide no incentives for banks to diversify as risk weights ignore the subadditivity feature of portfolio risk. As a result, firms tend to concentrate their entire portfolio on one asset category or exposure according to a false risk weight, and the underestimation of risk weights (as banks use their own models in Basel II) automatically leads to excess leverage.
This reliance on regulatory risk weights appears to have not only left financial sectors under-capitalized, but likely also provided perverse incentives to build up exposures to low risk-weight assets. Overall, we argue that stress tests relying on Basel risk regulation are not sufficient because (a) the increase of risk over time cannot be captured ex ante without market-based measures, and (b) risk weights are flawed cross-sectionally as banks can game their risk-weighted assets, i.e. take advantage of (a) to reduce their regulatory capital requirements. If the regulator does not use market measures of risk, a capital requirement based on the size and leverage of banks delivers more consistent results than the risk-based capital shortfall of stress tests.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces macroprudential stress tests and Vlab. We test the stress tests losses in Section 3 and the stressed capital ratios and shortfalls in Section 4. The efficacy of regulatory risk weights is tested in Section 5.
Stress tests and Vlab

Macroprudential stress tests sample
We consider stress tests conducted on a US and EU-wide level. is not a stress test but has been an additional tool to restore market confidence with the recommendation and the creation of an exceptional and temporary capital buffer.
The disclosure level of a stress test outcome is a strategic decision of the regulator that is well discussed in Goldstein and Sapra (2012) , Petrella and Resti (2013) Tables 1 (US) and 2 (EU).
An alternative to stress tests: Vlab
Next to stress tests conducted by US and European regulators, a team of researchers at NYU Stern School of Business developed an alternative methodology to measure the systemic risk of financial institutions purely based on publicly available information (see Acharya et al. (2010a ; Brownlees and Engle (2011) The Long-Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES) captures the co-movement of a firm with the market index; LRMES is the average of a firm's returns across the simulation paths where the market return falls by 40% over six months (see Brownlees and Engle (2011) ). 4 Defining M V as today's market capitalization of a firm, LRM ES * M V is the expected market cap loss that equity holders would face during the 6-month crisis scenario.
The capital shortfall of a firm (SRISK) is then derived assuming the book value of its debt (D) stays unchanged over the six-month scenario while its market cap falls by
where k is the prudential capital ratio.
Vlab uses a prudential capital ratio k of 8% for US banks and a milder k of 5.5% for European banks to account for the difference in leverage due to different accounting standards in the two regions: EU banks report under IFRS whereas US banks report under US GAAPs.
Under US GAAPs, banks are allowed to report their derivatives on a net basis. The netting of derivatives is most of the time not allowed under IFRS norms leading to a substantial increase of the size of the balance sheet. Engle et al. (2012) indicate that the total assets of large US banks would be between 40% and 60% larger under IFRS than under US GAAPs.
As the stress is on the market value of equity, Vlab methodology can be viewed as a markto-market stress test. Vlab does not have the information granularity of the supervisory data of regulatory stress tests but the use of publicly available market data allows for realtime forward looking measures. Moreover, the simplicity of the Vlab scenario compared to the complex multi-factor scenarios of stress tests makes Vlab outcomes robust to various economic environments. Vlab is therefore viewed as a macroprudential benchmark that regulators may be interested to use in the assessment of their own stress tests outcomes.
Differences in scenarios and data of Vlab and regulatory stress tests are further discussed in Appendix A.
We show the aggregate output of common banks between stress tests and Vlab in 
Testing stressed losses
Stress test models translate the stress scenario into a bank outcome. The most direct impact of the stress scenario should be visible on banks' projected losses. We show that, despite different scenarios, data and models, stress test losses and Vlab losses correlate well, and both predict the ranking of banks' realized losses under severe economic conditions.
Stress tests vs. Vlab losses
We compare the projected losses of stress tests with Vlab's market cap loss (M V * LRM ES) in Table 3 . From this table, we notice the important gap between the "Loss" and the "Net Loss" of stress tests (especially in Europe) due to the effect of projected revenues under the stress scenario. The net loss is the main driver of capital diminution under stress and is the accounting equivalent of the Vlab loss. However, the order of amplitude of Vlab losses is similar to the amplitude of 'pure' losses of stress tests that do not include the stressed revenues. Moreover, the Vlab loss is a six-month loss whereas stress tests losses are projected over two years. The Vlab market cap loss therefore appears more severe than the stress tests capital losses.
The rank correlations of the Vlab loss with the total losses of stress tests are very high and significant in all stress tests (see Table 4 , panel A). Huang et al. (2012) Acharya et al. (2010b) . 6 We also report the correlations of the Vlab loss with the stress tests loan losses and trading losses since they are the most important sources of losses (85%) according to the CCAR 2012. The correlations of the Vlab loss with the loan and trading losses are also very high and significant, making Vlab's ranking and the ranking of losses under supervisory stress scenarios very consistent.
The correlations of the Vlab loss with the total net loss (including stressed revenues) are 5 The Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010b) , the CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) , and the marginal contribution to the Distress Insurance Premium (DIP) of Huang et al. (2009) .
6 Huang et al. (2012) use the marginal expected shortfall (MES) instead of the long-run counterpart LRMES, and the MES is multiplied by the Tier 1 capital instead of the market capitalization.
smaller for all stress tests and negative in Europe; banks with higher profits under the EBA and CEBS stress scenarios are predicted to have higher losses in Vlab. Some banks actually report positive profits under the stress scenario of stress tests where stressed revenues cover stressed losses.
7 The profits are then reported in the balance sheet so that the divergence with Vlab is also visible in capital changes. We show in Figure 1 that the projected profits under the EBA stress scenario lead to increasing capital levels for many banks with the largest Vlab losses.
Predicting banks' real losses during the European sovereign debt crisis
It is important to note that stress tests outcomes are not usual forecasts; they are forecasts conditional on specific adverse macro-economic scenarios. Ideally, we would compare stress test outcomes to the real outcomes of banks during a period in which the state of the world is exactly the same as described in the stress scenario. Exact stress scenarios do not occur in reality so we select stress tests followed by a period in which the economic conditions sufficiently deteriorate to proxy for the realization of a stress scenario. First, the stress scenario is not an absolute scenario as in Vlab but is defined as a deviation from a baseline scenario. If some banks are projected to make large profits in the baseline scenario, they will make lower but still positive profits under the adverse scenario. Second, the EBA explains that the stress scenario may lead to a higher net interest income where some banks assume that the impact of higher interest rates will be passed onto customers without a corresponding increase in the cost of funding for the bank. Then, the EBA considers a directional market risk stress test; depending on the direction of their exposures banks can realize trading gains on certain portfolios.
2011 was followed by a mixed performance of the economy: the European and world index returns were still slightly negative, but the S&P500 return was positive.
We focus on the EBA 2011 stress test to assess the forecasting performance of Vlab and stress tests, as it is the only stress test with bank-level disclosure followed by a global economic downturn. The realized returns from 06/30/2011 to 12/31/2011 of the S&P500, the Eurostoxx50 and the ACWI World index were respectively -4.89%, -20.67%, and -13.47%.
This outcome was less severe than the Vlab scenario (40% decline in the World equity index) and is closer to the ECB scenario (15% decline in stock prices in the Euro area). Table 5 shows the similar performance of Vlab and the EBA in forecasting the actual ranking of banks' realized outcomes during the European sovereign debt crisis. We consider as realized outcomes the realized loss (panel A) and the realized return (panel B). The realized return of bank i at time t is − t+1+W t+1 ln(p it /p it−1 ), where p it is the stock price of the bank and its realized loss is defined by
where M V it is the market-value of equity of bank i (all converted in Euros), with t = 06/30/2011 and W = 130 (six months). When we look at correlations in the small and large subsamples, the EBA projected total losses are a better predictor of the ranking of realized losses of large banks than Vlab. The correlation of the realized loss with the EBA projected total net loss is negative (except for large banks) since many banks with positive projected profits in the stress test actually endured the highest losses during the sovereign debt crisis.
For predicting realized returns (panel B), evidence also show that the stress on capital was too mild in the EBA stress test: Vlab long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) is a better predictor of the amplitude of realized returns according to the root mean square error (RMSE). However, the estimated core Tier 1 capital return over the EBA stress scenario better predicts the ranking of realized six-month returns than Vlab LRMES suggesting that the ranking of stressed capital in the EBA stress test was correct (after controlling for size).
Testing stressed capital ratios and shortfalls
Capital ratios are the most important output of stress tests. They determine which bank failed the test under the stress scenario and the resulting supervisory measures or recapitalization plans. In US Dodd-Frank-Act stress tests, banks have to pass regulatory thresholds on four ratios each quarter of the stress scenario: the Tier 1 Common Capital Ratio (T1CR), the Tier 1 Capital Ratio (T1R), the Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio (Total CR) and the Tier 1 Leverage Ratio (T1 LVGR). 10 The only ratio to be passed in the EBA stress test is the Core Tier 1 Capital Ratio, which is considered equivalent to the US definition of the T1CR. The ratios of four stress tests are reported in Tables 1 (CCAR 2012 and tests are also shown in Tables 1 and 2 .
Stress tests vs. Vlab ratio
The Vlab equivalent to the estimated capital shortfalls of stress tests is the marketbased estimate SRISK (eq. (1)). To facilitate the comparison with stress test ratios, we define the Vlab market leverage ratio under stress (M-LVGR s ) as the ratio of market cap to quasi-market assets under the Vlab stress scenario
The total estimated capital shortfalls and the cross-sectional average of ratios of Vlab and stress tests are reported in Table 3 . The severity of Vlab SRISK and M-LVGR s is in striking contrast with stress tests estimates for all stress tests. This is consistent with the finding of 
where k is the prudential capital ratio threshold used in the stress test (5% in the EBA 2011), RW A S and Capital S are respectively the risk-weighted assets and the capital level of a bank at the end of the stress scenario. We actually observe that most European banks end up with a capital excess at the end of the stress scenario (see Figure 5a ) when we remove the zero bound and derive the 'absolute' capital shortfall
The rank correlation of SRISK with (5) is highly negative, significant and almost the same in the last two European stress tests (-0.791 (CEBS 2010) and -0.790 (EBA 2011), see Table   4 ). Therefore, banks with the highest estimated capital shortfall in Vlab are considered to be the safest and the most well capitalized banks in European stress tests. Size, however, also plays a role in this result as the correlation with SRISK decreases for small banks (-0.53 in the EBA 2011 stress test) and is not significant in the group of large banks.
All of the most systemically important institutions according to SRISK end up with large capital excesses at the end of the stress scenario of European stress tests. We show this result in Figure 5a It is hard to believe that the European financial sector was so well capitalized when the EBA stress test was disclosed in July 2011. The estimated SRISK of Dexia of 26 EUR bn at the end of June 2011 appears more credible than the EBA capital excess of 7.9 EUR bn, knowing that Dexia was the first bank to be bailed out in the context of the European sovereign crisis in October 2011. The resolution plan of Dexia included the sale of its Belgian banking subsidiary for 4 EUR bn to the Belgian government, the sale of some of its assets and businesses, and guarantees of up to 90 EUR bn provided by Belgium, France and Luxembourg.
12 The resolution plan led to a net loss of 11.6 EUR bn for 2011 due to the discounted sales of assets.
Another piece of evidence of the failure of the 2011 stress test comes from the EBA's own estimates, five months later, of an "exceptional and temporary capital buffer to address current market concerns over sovereign risk and other residual credit risk related to the current difficult market environment". The recommended capital buffer (the "Overall Shortfall") of 115 EUR bn, well above the 2.5 EUR bn estimate of the EBA stress test, is defined by
where Buf f SOV ≥ 0 is an additional capital buffer for sovereign debt exposures in the European Economic Area (EEA). The overall shortfall is not the outcome of a stress test but is the result of three main drivers: the target 9% T1 core capital ratio (instead of 5%), the application of Basel 2.5 to derive risk-weighted assets (increasing the capital requirement for market risk), and the sovereign buffer on EEA sovereign debt exposures (one third of the buffer). 13 The rank correlation of SRISK with the EBA overall shortfall is positive (0.133)
but not significant at 5%. The exercise corrected for the underestimated sovereign risk weights with the additional sovereign capital buffer but many SRISK-top banks like Crédit
Agricole still had zero capital shortfall in the EBA Capital Exercise (see Figure 4b ). We may argue that the estimates of the exercise were still too low compared to SRISK (see Table 3) and arrived too late in December 2011 as many banks were already in deep financial trouble.
12 Dexia agrees to Belgian bail-out, Financial Times, October 10, 2011. 
Risk-based capital vs. leverage
The assessment of bank leverage using a Tier 1 leverage ratio (T1 LVGR) defined as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets is a recommendation of Basel III to supplement the risk-based regime (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011)). Haldane (2012) shows that this ratio significantly predicts the failure of financial firms whereas the risk-based core The contrast between risk-based and leverage-based stress tests outcomes is even more obvious when the stress test capital shortfall is written as a function of total assets. We show in Table 4 (panel B) and Figure 5b that the correlation between SRISK and the capital shortfall of the EBA stress test becomes highly positive (0.679) and significant when the EBA shortfall is written as a function of total assets instead of risk-weighted assets. The leverage-based capital shortfall is given by
where k is the same prudential ratio used in Vlab (5.5% for European banks), and T A S are the total assets of the bank at the end of the stress scenario. The result holds when we control for the size; the rank correlation between (7) and SRISK remains high and significant 
EU-US differences
The ultimate impact of the stress scenario is a decline in capital ratios under both US and EU stress tests. However, this result comes from a diminution of capital (the numerator) in the US whereas increasing RWA (the denominator) is the main driver of lower capital ratios in Europe (see Tables 1 and 2 ). We will see in the next section that RWA definitions are not the same however; RWA are derived under Basel I in the US (before 2013) and under Basel II in the EU.
Stress tests of the Federal Reserve focus on the 19 largest US BHCs whereas European stress tests concern 90 banks representing 65% of the assets in the EU banking sector. We can expect more heterogeneity in the 90 banks of 21 EU countries due to their different sizes and business models.
Other differences come from different stress scenario trajectories and assumptions on balance sheet growth. The SCAP 2009, the CEBS 2010 and the EBA 2011 have a static balance sheet evolution assumption whereas the CCAR assumes that the size of the balance sheet can change according to economic conditions. US stress scenarios tend to revert to a 'normal state' of the world at the end of each scenario, unlike the EBA which assumes further deterioration of the economic situation the second year of the stress scenario. This is the reason why the Federal Reserve considers minimum ratios over the scenario horizon to determine which banks failed the stress test, while European stress tests consider ratios at the end of the stress scenario.
Overall, different definitions, samples, assumptions and scenarios lead to a RWA fall of 6.1% at the end of the supervisory stress scenario of the CCAR 2012 and a RWA increase of 14% under the EBA 2011 adverse scenario. Moreover, the leverage ratio cannot reflect the European stress scenario as the stress appears in risk weights and total assets are assumed constant over the scenario. Stressed leverage ratios also decline less in the US than stressed risk-based ratios. The impact of the projected total assets and RWA changes on US ratios is not straightforward according to the Federal Reserve however.
Testing the efficacy of regulatory risk weights
A major difference between Vlab and stress test measures comes from the denominator of regulatory ratios. Regulatory ratios and shortfalls are expressed as a function of riskweighted assets whereas Vlab uses quasi-market assets. While the forbearance of the stress tests outcomes could be addressed by a more severe scenario, stricter modeling assumptions or simply a larger threshold k as in the EBA Capital Exercise, we show that the misallocation of capital shortfall across banks is caused by risk weights and call for additional measures of risk in a macro stress test. Merrouche (2013) attribute the decline in risk weights when banks switch to the IRB approach to strategic risk modeling, and that effect to be particularly important for weakly capitalized banks. Third, the internal models used to derive risk weights are completely opaque. Haldane (2012) indicates that risk weights are black boxes that investors do not understand or trust. These concerns have important implications for the European stress tests outcomes knowing that 59 of the 90 participating banks in the EBA 2011 stress test are IRB banks, i.e. they use their own models to derive risk weights under the stress scenario.
Basel I and Basel II
Stress tests vs. Vlab risk weight
Acharya et al. (2012) establish a connection between Vlab estimates and regulatory risk-
18 The RCAP of the banking book disclosed in July 2013 however indicates that three quarters of differences in banking book risk weights across banks are explained by differences in banks' exposures (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013a)).
weighted assets by defining the effective aggregate market risk weight to total assets corresponding to a SRISK of zero. The Vlab aggregate risk weight is
and is comparable to the aggregate regulatory risk weight defined by the ratio of RWA to total assets (also called RWA density in Le Lesle and Avramova (2012)). The risk weight could be interpreted as an aggregate measure of risk per unit of asset; the smaller the risk weight, the less risky the asset holdings of a bank.
As the Vlab risk weight is conditional on a crisis, we compare it to the stressed aggregate risk weights of stress tests. Figure 6a compares the projected risk weight at the end of the EBA stress scenario with the Vlab risk weight. These measures of risk have nothing in common; the rank correlation is negative (-0.238) and not significant at 5%. Dexia and Crédit Agricole are among the riskiest banks according to the Vlab measure and among the safest with the stress test risk weight; both banks have values above the 75% quantile of the Vlab risk weight distribution while both appear below the 25% quantile of the EBA risk weight distribution.
Forecasting risk during the European sovereign debt crisis
This section empirically validates the risk measures of stress tests and Vlab as aggregate measures of bank risk during a crisis. To that end, we compare the performance of these measures to predict a realized measure of risk; the six-month realized volatility defined by
where W = 130 days (six months),r it,W is the six-month forward average return of bank i at date t (the disclosure date of the EBA stress test). A striking result appears in The absence of correlation between the stressed risk weights and the realized risk of banks during a crisis shows furthermore that Basel risk weights are also misleading in a macro stress test. Risk weights have no predictive power as they are derived from accounting data and therefore can only be updated ex-post. The absence of predictive power of stressed risk weights during the European sovereign debt crisis also supports the argument of Haldane (2012) that risk-weighting is suboptimal in an uncertain environment.
We reproduce the results of Das and Sy (2012) for the banks in the EBA stress test with stressed risk weights instead of the actual ones. Different risk factors are regressed on the realized volatility measure in (9) and the estimated coefficients are presented in Table   6 . The effect of individual risk factors is reported in columns 2 to 4 where the impact of accounting-based vs. market-based risk measurement is accounted for by including the bookto-market ratio in each regression. According to the goodness-of-fit measures, the stressed Tier 1 leverage ratio is the most important factor followed by the Vlab risk weight. The table also shows that the parameter of the EBA stressed risk weight (column 4) is negative
and not a significant to predict the realized volatility.
The EBA stressed risk weight parameter, however, becomes positive and significant at 10% when we control for the other risk factors (column 6). This result suggests that regulatory risk weights can contain additional information on risk once we account for other more important risk factors like the Vlab risk weight, and the leverage ratio. The improvement in terms of adjusted R 2 is however small (3.76%, from columns 5 to 6) when the EBA stressed risk weight is added to the regression.
A final validation test looks at the change in risk from the disclosure of the EBA 2011 to six months after the disclosure. Specifically, we assess how the change in EBA risk weights over the stress scenario predicts the realized change in risk defined by RV i,t,W − RV i,t−W,W .
We show in LGDs, is well correlated to the realized risk change of small banks. We conclude that even if the EBA stressed risk weight is individually an incorrect measure of aggregate bank risk, the stress model applied on risk weights is correct. Projected changes in risk weights indeed predict the ranking of banks' risk increases during the European sovereign debt crisis.
The Vlab risk weight also predicts the change in risk, suggesting that the risk measure does not only predict a risk level but also reflects investors expectations on banks' risk evolution.
Portfolio choice under regulatory risk weights
We demonstrate in this section the weakness of Basel regulatory risk weights as an aggregate measure of bank risk where the bank is seen as a portfolio of assets. The bank chooses its allocation of resources to maximize its return subject to a tolerable level of risk. Regulators implement several standards of prudent risk but these may sometimes be misguided.
Here we consider the allocation of a fixed investment budget to asset categories subject to the regulatory requirement implemented in a stylized version of Basel standards.
Let T A be the total assets to be allocated between cash, C (equivalent to the capital requirement for credit risk in Basel II), and other risky assets. Let there be N risky assets with conditional expected returns given by the (N × 1) vector m, and conditional covariance matrix given by the (N × N ) matrix H. According to Basel rules, each of these assets has a risk weight w j between zero and one that we assemble in a (N × 1) vector w. The solution is a (N × 1) vector of dollars to be invested in each asset, q. The vector q will also determine the optimal exposures at default under Basel II and the optimal RWA, w q. The risk budget requires that C ≥ kw q, where k is the prudential capital ratio and C = T A − ι q, where ι is a (N × 1) vector of ones.
To maximize asset returns subject to these constraints the firm must solve
The Lagrangian of this maximization problem is
where the scalar λ and the (N × 1) vector µ are Lagrange multipliers. The first order condition of equation (11) with respect to q is given by
Multiplying equation (12) by q and recognizing that either q or µ will be zero for each asset (from the first order condition of (11) w.r.t. to µ), then
Hence all non-zero allocations q j , must satisfy
Supposing that each asset has a different value of m j (1 + kw j ) −1 , then the maximum will occur if the entire portfolio of the bank ι q is invested in the asset with the greatest value of this ratio. The amount invested in this asset will be
If there are multiple assets with the same value of this ratio, the performance will be the same for any feasible allocation to these assets.
The main observation is that the risk of a portfolio is always less than or equal to the sum of the risks of its components. The use of risk-weighted assets ignores this portfolio feature of risk and consequently there is no incentive from the regulatory perspective to diversify.
The only case where this measure is appropriate is when all assets are perfectly correlated.
For firms with risk aversion, risk weights act as an additional cost on assets. 19 Glasserman and Kang (2013) show that risk weights that are optimal from both banking and regulatory perspectives have nothing to do with risk but are instead proportional to the asset returns m. These optimal risk weights do not distort the portfolio a bank would chose without the risk-based capital constraint and satisfy the regulator's objective to limit the bank's portfolio riskiness.
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Then, if some risk weights are underestimated (as banks use their own risk models under Basel II) or are not adjusted to reflect increased risk during a crisis (as observed with Basel I risk weights in the CCAR 2012, and in Das and Sy (2012) ), a bank will choose its optimal asset with the most underestimated risk weight and this will automatically lead to excessive leverage. If w j is the risk weight of the optimal asset and since q j = ι q = T A − C, the leverage ratio C/T A from (16) is 1 − (1 + kw j ) −1 . Consequently, banks will take excessive leverage if their risk weights are not adequately adjusted to more severe economic conditions.
We show that the mechanical relationship between risk weights and leverage also holds empirically after the application of the stress scenario in the European stress test of 2011
( Figure 6b ). The rank correlation between stressed risk weights and stressed Tier 1 leverage is 0.62 for 53 European banks and increases to 0.89 for the 15 largest banks.
The theoretical result of (16) also explains the portfolio decisions of many Eurozone banks during the European sovereign debt crisis. Acharya and Steffen (2012) document that the increase of exposures to risky sovereign debt is partly explained by regulatory arbitrage; banks with higher risk weights increased their exposures to risky sovereign debt to reduce the cost of raising fresh capital, as these exposures have a zero capital requirement (zero-risk weight). To a large extent, it also explains the misguidance of stress tests about European banks risks. For example, Dexia was holding a portfolio of risky sovereign bonds of almost a third of its balance sheet largely financed with short-term debt. Acharya and Steffen (2012) further show that this type of behaviour was largly pervasive among Eurozone banks.
Therefore, the reliance on Basel risk weights appears not only to have left financial sectors undercapitalized but also incentivized the build up of risky sovereign debt exposures.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides an assessment of the outcomes of macroprudential stress tests conducted by US and European regulators. Concerns have been raised on the lack of robustness, severity and transparency of stress test measures. In this paper, we test the risk assessments and outcomes of stress tests against a market-based macroprudential benchmark (Vlab) that addresses many of those concerns.
We find that the projected losses of stress tests and Vlab correlate well and both predict the realized performance of banks under severe economic conditions. In contrast, the required capitalization of financial firms in stress tests is found to be inadequate ex post compared to the Vlab capital shortfall estimate SRISK. We document that this discrepancy arises due to the reliance of stress test outcomes on regulatory risk weights. The discrepancy is even larger with European stress tests ratios where a too mild stress on capital makes the impact of the stress scenario only apparent on the denominator (the risk-weighted assets). Therefore, the stressed risk weights appear as the main driver of the ranking of the lower capital ratios.
We show that the higher regulatory risk weights of stress tests have no link with the realized risk of banks during a crisis and are responsible for the misallocation of capital shortfall across banks. For example, Dexia appeared to be one of the safest bank in the latest European stress test disclosed in July 2011, but ranked among the riskiest banks in Vlab. Three months later, Dexia was the first bank to be bailed out in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis.
Risk weights tend to be informative only when we control for a market measure of risk and the Tier 1 leverage ratio. Furthermore, Basel risk standards based on risk-weighted assets are demonstrated to provide no diversification incentives as they ignore the subadditivity feature of portfolio risk. Therefore, banks are encouraged to invest their entire portfolio in one asset category or exposure according to a false risk measure, and the underestimation of risk weights (as banks use their own models in Basel II) automatically leads to excess leverage.
This paper recommends that regulatory stress tests complement their assessment of bank and system risks by using market measures of risk. If the regulator does not assess financial stability using market-based measures, a capital requirement based on the size and leverage of banks is shown to deliver more consistent estimates of the aggregate bank risk than the risk-based capital shortfalls of stress tests. The paper therefore welcomes the new Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratio, but the misguidance of the asset risk-return allocation is likely to be present in future stress tests as long as the reliance on static regulatory risk weights remains under Basel III.
------- 5.7% min (2) 6.8% min (0) (1) Stress tests "Total Net Loss" (i.e. net of revenues) and "Total Loss" are defined in Table 3 , without a zero bound on net losses. Stress tests ratios are defined in Table 2 . "min" stands for the minimum ratio over the 9 quarters of the CCAR scenario or the minimum ratio over the two years of the EBA 2011 stress scenario, other ratios are ratios at the end of the stress scenario. The symbol indicates ratios based on stress tests results without the effect of capital actions and restructuring plans. endogenous nature of systemic risk where feedback effects from the financial sector amplify the macro-economic crisis. Borio et al. (2012) indicate that the selection of a stress scenario is easier when the stress tests are crisis management tools since they are designed to address apparent risks. Indeed, in the SCAP 2009, the decline of local house prices was a significant factor in larger loan loss rates. In the EBA 2011, country-specific shocks to sovereign credit spreads translated into valuation haircuts of banks' sovereign exposures.
Other concerns come from the coherence and plausibility of stress scenarios, which could dilute their severity. Relating to Vlab's 40% equity market index decline over six months, the EBA stress scenario considers a fall of between 10% to 20% in equity prices over two years. The CCAR 2012 assumes a 50% drop in the Dow Jones total stock market index in the middle of the scenario (late 2012) but reverts to a higher level at the end of the scenario. We argue that this focus on plausibility, while can facilitate the buy-in of all stakeholders involved in a macro stress test (Borio et al. (2012) ), severely undermines the reliability of stress test results.
A.2. Data
A.2.1. Public vs. supervisory US and EU-wide stress tests are implemented using extended bank supervisory data. US BHCs submit their data confidentially to the Federal Reserve using standardized FR Y-14A forms. These forms contain detailed information on capital composition, loan and security portfolios, trading and counterparty exposures, and historical P&L. The reports additionally collect BHCs' own projections of losses and revenues as well as their estimates of exposure sensitivities to a set of risk factors specified by the Federal Reserve. In Europe, banks implement stress tests themselves and use their own data. Banks are encouraged by the EBA to use all the time series available on credit risk parameters and P&L figures for the application of the macro scenario.
Relating to EU and US stress tests, Vlab could be qualified as a non-invasive stress test. Vlab results are obtained from a reduced dataset of publicly available data including historical market prices, market capitalization, and leverage.
A.2.2. Market vs. accounting
Stress scenarios are generally applied to accounting data in supervisory stress tests whereas Vlab applies to the market value of equity. In that respect, Vlab may be considered a mark-to-market stress test. Market prices are believed to reflect expectations of all market participants on bank performance and are available in real time. Harris et al. (2012) further argue that balance sheet data, since they are single-point estimates at a specific reporting date, cannot reflect the dynamic risks embedded in assets and liabilities. For these reasons, market data are considered to be more informative than accounting numbers.
Another problem concerning accounting data comes from their lack of uniformity. Accounting standards are different; US banks report under US GAAP and European banks under IFRS. This leads to the large differences in the leverage ratios mentioned earlier. But even under the same standards there still exist large cross-border differences as pointed out by the EBA. Moreover, accounting rules are subject to different interpretations at the bank level.
For these reasons, the reliability of accounting data may be questionable during a crisis. We have shown in Section 5.3 that banks with high book-to-market ratios experienced higher realized volatility during the European sovereign debt crisis. The positive and significant correlation between the book-to-market ratio and risk indicates that investors do not trust banks estimates of capital levels during crises. In the US too, the book-to-market ratio increased after the financial crisis; market capitalizations were far above regulatory capital levels in 2008 but the market cap is generally below the regulatory capital in 2011.
A.3. Vlab as a macroprudential benchmark
According to Borio et al. (2012) , any stress test has four elements: the scenario, the risk exposures, the model, and the outcome. The scenario specifies the shocks that will be applied to bank data using a specific model, and the resulting measures are the final outcome of the stress test. The simplicity of Vlab's data and scenario may represent its main weakness. It does not have the information granularity at the asset category or exposure level that stress tests possess. Vlab does not, however, do worse than stress tests when it comes to forecasting real bank outcomes during a crisis, as shown in Section 3.2. Instead, the use of publicly available market data makes Vlab estimates richer and more transparent; it provides real-time forward-looking measures of risk and addresses concerns on the reliability and consistency of accounting-based measures across firms. The simplicity of the Vlab scenario makes its outcomes robust to various economic environments and supports the argument in Haldane (2011 Haldane ( , 2012 ) that complex uncertain environments call for simpler rules. Vlab severity makes SRISK the binding constraint for banks whereas stress tests estimates are not binding (Hanson et al. (2011) ). Vlab SRISK may therefore be a useful complementary tool for regulators to assess their own stress tests outcomes.
